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LEGITIMATE 
Wha.t is the 'raison d'etre' of legiti-
mate defence? What justifies it? When 
and under what cirownstances? 
$'elf-defence is a rig_ht based on 
common sense because it comes as a 
n_atural instinct. It is an inherent right 
to protect onself from any personal 
aggressor and, since we live in a civil-
ired. worJd, we shouitd feel ourselves 
constrained if not bound by human 
sympathy to defend others who are 
unjustly assaulted and in need of help. 
This natural right of every individual 
is not a modern concept of law, but ~t 
has been the theme of great philoso-
phers. Ciooro the greatest phil'Osopher 
of Rome, who also ·happens to be the 
first known legal writer, writes in 'Pro 
Milone' Chapter 10 et seq., that the re-
pelling of aggression by force is a natu-
ral instinct: 
'Est haec non script.a, sed nata lex, 
quam non didicimus accepimus, 
leginws, verum ex natura etc.' 
HOBBES, a modern English philoso-
pher from the positivist school, again 
states in his book 'LEVIATHAN' 
Chapter 27: 
'for no human law can oblige a 
man to abandon his own preserva-
tion'. 
Legal writers do not justify this de-
fence with a mere philosophical state-
ment, but they produce legal argu-
ments. Carrara looks at it from the 
subje~tive point of view . . He arg11€s 
that if the state, because of any cir-
cumstanoo whatsoever, is incapa.ble of 
protecting the rights of an individual, 
while that individual ·himself has that 
ability, then the right of protection of 
which the state possesses, passes auto-
matically on to the individual himself. 
In fact Carrara says: 
'Il f ondamento della legittima dif e-
sa riposa sul principio che, cessi 
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nella societa la funzione del punire 
aLorquando la difesa. privata pos-
sa essere efficace ed invece si pale-
si impotente od insuffi.ciente la di-
f esa pubblica., 
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The positivist school bring a differ-
ent argument to justify the legitimate 
defence. They say: 
'che l'interesse dell'aggredito coin-
cide coll'interesse sociale, nel sen-
SOt che la societa ha maggiore inte-
resso aEa c.onservazione dell'indi-
viduo aggredito, ch'e individuo 
onesto, in confronto della conser-
vaziione dell'aggressore, che'e indi-
vlduo criminale ed antisociale'. 
Other authors disagree with Carrara 
and the subjective point of view, and 
they justify the self defence objective-
1 y. These authors: 
'posero la ragione della legittima 
difesa non piu ne11' elemento sog-
gettivo del reato ma nell'elemento 
oggettivo, affermando che l' atto 
eon ciu si respinge l'a.ltrui inguista 
violenz.a e Conforme al diritto e 
manca, quindi, di quel!a antiguiri-
dicita che e necessaria perche 
un'a.zione possa venire elevata a 
reato'. 
Thus, in the act of self def enee~ there 
is ~acking that element which is neces-
sary to make the act a crime, viz, the 
'actus reus'. 
Florian together with Fem does not 
agree with the above arguments and 
he insists: 
'che la guistifi.icazione sia nei moti-
vi determinanti al rea to'. 
Professor Sir Anthony Mamo seems 
to agree with Ca?Tara's theory, when 
he states that: 
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'Where the hand of the state on 
account of the time OI' place in 
which the agression takes place 
cannot intervene to protect him, 
every person is entitled to resist 
by force any wanton aggression.' 
It would l:e better, now, before we 
pro<:eed1 to have a look at what the 
Criminal Cede rays on the eubject of 
l.€gitimate defence. This topic js first 
mentioned in section 237 which sa.yc 
that: 
'No offence is committed when a 
homocide C!l" a bodi~y ha.rm is or-
dered or permitted by law or by a 
lawful authority, or is imp0sed by 
actual necessity either in ·lawful 
self de.fence or in the lawful de-
fence of another person.> 
In the next section the code goes on 
to give three cases of 'actual necessity', 
which it must be said, ar.e not exhaus-
tive but exemplary. In fact the first 
thing that strikes us in this section is 
the vagueness of this phrase, for tht! 
code does not give any hard and fast 
rules wher-e the self defence is appli-
cable. However, we get a very good 
idea of what the limitations of this law 
are from the local jurisprudence. 
In the case of Polke vs. Joseph At. 
ta.rd - 11th Novemlber 1963, Judge 
Harding~ said: 
'L-estremi tal-legittima difesa ma 
jistgliux j.igu indikati ahjar milli 
bil-formula klassika tal-Carrara Ii 
1-perikolu hemm l::.Zonn Ii jkun in-
gust, graYi u inevitabili. Skritturi 
ohira ma ghamlux hlief eleboraw 
dawn 1-e'.ementi.1 
It is therefore best to consider the 
three elements arising from Carrara's 
'classical formula'. 
The first element mentior.ed is that 
the evil threatened must be unjust. It 
is obvious that if the evil threatened 
is legitimate, then one has to submit 
himself to it and cannot defend him-
se]f, beeause 1a.ltrimenti 1 says Florian 
'non si t:atterebbe p:u di difesa, ma di 
offe·sa o di :ril:ellbne. • So a man sen-
tenced to death cannot attack the exe-
cutioner in trying to escape. 
The r£~ond distinction Carrara 
makes is that the evil avoided must be 
grave. Our law, unlike that of other 
countries e .. g. England and Germany, 
considers as grave only that which 
threatens the life, the body or the chas-
tity of the individual. Mere interven-
tion with property will not justify any 
bodily harm. Scetion 238 (a) justifies 
only the case: 
'where the homicide or bodily 
harm is committed in the act of 
repe Jing during the nigh time, the 
sc.:ding or breaking of enclosures, 
wa·ls, or the entrance doors or any 
house or inhal:ited appartment, or 
of the appurtenances ther--eof hav-
ing a direct or indirect communi-
cation with such house or appart-
ment'. 
It is quite dear that unless an ag· 
gres~r is attacked at one of these 
stages there is no legitimate defence. 
Once he is on one's property and he is 
merely tampering with it then -one can-
not use force to send him out. In fact 
in the case of Police vs. Joseph Micallef 
on the 25th June, 1955, Judge Harding 
gave this interpretation: 
'Id-dispoZizzjoni tal-Ugi Ii tiskuza 
lil min j.ikkaguna offiza lil persuna 
ohr.a in difeZa. tal-proprieta ~l­
feritur, tirrikiedi Ii 1-azzj<mi, biex 
tkun skuZa.bbli, ghandha titvolgi 
ruliha dak il-mument stess Ii tkun 
qieghda tigi invarja 1-proprieta u 
in difeta attwali tagliha. Jekk me· 
ta 1-feritur irrejeggixxa, il-ferut ga 
kien dalial fil-proptieta tal-feritur, 
ma hem.mx kwistjoni ta' attwalita 
ta' rezistenza kontra 1-vjolazzjoni 
waqt Ii qieghda ssir il-vjofazzjoni.' 
The English la.w does not agree with 
this principale of ours, but on the con-
trary it allows a person to force out 
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any trespasser on his property, provid-
ed he does not kill him. Archbo!d, in 
fact, tells us that the owner can pur-
sue the aggressor until his property is 
complete·y out of danger. He a:lso goes 
on to say that: 
'In defence of a man's house, the 
owner or his family ma.y kil a tres-
passer who would forcibly dis-
posses him of his property, in the 
same manner, as he might by law 
ki:l in self defence a man who at-
tacks his person.' 
Flo·rian agrees with our Code, that 
the defence of property is not legiti-
mate. In fact he says: 
'Qlll!anto alla difesa dei beni, il 
legh:lat.:>re ha dittato norme spe-
ciali per cui, l'attacco ai beni gius-
tifica la reazione solo in quanto 
presenti pericolo alla persona.' 
It is worth noting that if the attack 
mentioned :above is done at night the 
legitimate defence falls under section 
237 (a) and is justified. If however, 
the same attack is done in broad day-
light, the same act of defence fains un-
der section 241 (-b) and is not justi-
fied but merely excusable. 
Carrara's third disposition1 that of 
the inevitability of the act, ~gain 
branches out into three -other requi-
sites namely that the danger must be 
sudden, actual and absolute. 
If the danger were not sudden.; that 
is, if it had been anticipated then it is 
not right that a person ignores such a 
threat so that he is then forced to kill 
when he could have avoided all this be-
fore. · 
The danger threatened must be ac-
tual, because i.f the danger had already 
passed then the ·person .assaulted can-
not pursue the aggression. Indeed this 
wou~d be cold blooded revenge. How-
ever, at the same time one is not ex-
pected to Jet the aggressor strike first. 
If the dan1ger is imminent and certain 
one can anticipate. In Police vs. Grez.io 
Mallia on th 22nd February, 1930, it 
was said by Judge Ganado that we may 
accept the rule. 
'N emo tenetur expectare donec 
percutiatur.' 
The third disposition, is that the 
danger threatened must be absolute, 
that is, it could not be avoided by any 
other means. This brings us to a very 
contro.versial arguement. Should the 
person a.esaulted try to retreat before 
infiicting any bodily harm or even kE-
ling the aggressor? The superior 
courts of the United States and conti-
nental writers hold that one is not ob-
Uged ta do so becaus.e one cannot, in 
those cdrcumstances, reason out what 
is best for his assailant. Florian in fact 
argues: 
'noi crediamo che codesta condizio-
ne non debba am.mettersi1 non po-
tendo la legge imporr_e la fuga: 
d'altronde l'animo agitato dell'ag-
gredito difficilimente potrebbe di-
scernire i casi, in cui la fuga fosse 
possibile ed utHe.' 
Some En.glish jurists do not agree 
with the a:bove statements. Thus Arch-
bold states: 
'To Ehow that it was homicide in 
self defence, it .must appear that 
the party killing had retreated 
either as far as he could by reason 
of some wall, ditch or other impe· 
diment or as far as the fierceness 
of the assault would permit him.' 
Our courts also had occasion to give 
its own interpretation on this point in 
the case·s Police vs. Saver Agius., . '1. 
the 7th November, 1953 and in the case 
Polic.e vs. Carmelo Cas'Sar on the 2nd 
April, 1927. Both these cases agree 
with the English point of view and ob-
lige the person assaulted to retreat. In 
the case Police vs. Carmelo Cassar, 
Judge Camilleri said: 
'Fu esclusa la legittima difesa ... .. . 
fra altro sul motiro della mancan-
z.a della necessita attuale di respin~ 
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gere la. violenza, avendo potuto il 
citato sehivare ii pericolo da lui 
preteso ricoverandosi in una vicina 
bottega e chiamando la gente vici-
na a proteggerlo.' 
Finally in order to obtain full justi-
fication, the means adopted to ward off 
an apprehended danger must be pro-
portionate. That means if one is as-
saulted he cannot go beyond that 
which is nece~ary to resist the aggres-
sion and he cannot take it upon hi~lf 
to punish his aggressor. 
Our jurisprudence abounds in the 
above reasoning. The typical case of 
excess in self defence is when the per-
son assaulted uses some weapon to de-
f end himself. This excess is particular-
ly stated in the case Police vs.. Saver 
Aguis, 7th November, 1953. However 
we must take into consideration the 
actual state of mind the pera'On who 
has suddenly been attacked would be in 
and one cannot but agree with tile 
statement that: 
'Detached reftection cannot be de-
manded in the presence of an up-
Jifted knife'. 
This theory is in fact applied by 
Judge Harding in the above case Police 
vs. Saver Aguis. 
'Dan 1-eccess pero mhux soggett 
glial piena ghax hu ovvju lli 1-im-
putat gie mehud ghall-gharrieda u 
nhasad u beza'.' 
The last question which provokes an 
immediate answer is: Who can put for-
ward such a plea of self def enc·e? Our 
courts have left no doubt that this plea 
can only be put forward by the person 
as~aulted and never by the a.ggra.c:sor 
himself. 
'Il-provokatur mhux intitol!it 
ghall-iskriminanti ta.l-ligittima di-
fesa'. 
Police vs. Sidor Caruana 3rd Feb. 
1955. 
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